This paper provides conditions under which the inequality constraints generated by either single agent optimizing behavior or the best response condition of multiple agent problems can be used as a basis for estimation and inference. An application illustrates how the use of these inequality...

In this paper we extend the collusion framework to allow for heterogeneity among firms, investment, entry and exit. The focus is on a model with symmetric information in which it is hard to sustain collusion when either; one of the firms does not keep up with the advances of its competitors...

In May, 1981, a voluntary export restraint (VER) was placed on exports of automobiles from Japan to the United States. As trade policies go, this one was important. The automobile industry is the largest manufacturing industry in the United States and the initiation of the VER captured head-...

This paper reviews a framework for numerically analyzing dynamic interactions in imperfectly competitive industries. The framework dates back to Ericson and Pakes [1995. Review of Economic Studies 62, 53-82], but it is based on equilibrium notions that had been available for some time before,...

<p>This paper provides conditions under which the inequality constraints generated by either single agent optimizing behavior, or by the Nash equilibria of multiple agent problems, can be used as a basis for estimation and inference. We also add to the econometric literature on inference in models...</p>