We introduce a simple and robust approach to answering two key questions in empirical auction analysis: discriminating between models of entry and quantifying the revenue gains from improving auction design. The approach builds on Bulow and Klemperer (1996), connecting their theoretical results...

We develop a Bayes–Nash analysis of the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, the multi-unit auction used by search engines to sell sponsored advertising positions. Our main result characterizes the efficient Bayes–Nash equilibrium of the GSP and provides a necessary and sufficient...

We estimate how physicians’ financial incentives affect their treatment choices in heart attack management, using a large dataset of private health insurance claims. Different insurance plans pay physicians different amounts for the same services, generating the required variation in...

I develop a procedure for estimating how accurately people perceive their income tax schedules. Using Survey of Income and Program Participation data on hourly-paid workers, I reject the hypothesis of fully salient taxes. Younger workers seem particularly prone to misperceiving their taxes. Even...

Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and natural resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales where we estimate the model, and...

Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of US Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales used for estimation, and when we predict...

Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and natural resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales where we estimate the model, and...

A large body of research has explored the importance of auction design and information structure for auction outcomes. Much less work has considered the importance of the auction process. For example, in many auctions, auctioneers are present and can impact the process of the auction by varying...

This note tests the assumption of dynamic discrete choice models that underlying utility shocks have an extreme value type I distribution. We find that extreme value type I shocks cannot be rejected in most specifications of the Rust (1987) bus engine replacement model.