Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011205254
In an open innovation relationship, the party that owns a key asset enjoys bargaining power that discourages the investments of the other party in the collaboration. We show that these incentives can be restored by conferring on the weak party the power to take decisions during the research...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776714
This paper investigates the governance design problem of a large company that wants to engage a small and cashless firm into a research collaboration. This analysis reflects the frequently observed collaborations between pharma companies and biotechs, and an actual research contract is assessed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576696
This paper investigates the relationship between an employer and a knowledge worker when an arrangement is set ex-ante to a¤ect the relative bargaining position in the ex-post negotiation. Specically, we study what drives the employers decision to endow the worker with the rights to control the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008501719
The increasing competition in the labor market for human capital pushes firms to create better incentives to manage talented individuals. In this article, we model the optimal employment contract when two features of human capital are present: (i) private information of the employee about his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554045
Managing research collaborations remains challenging in many respects. The research efforts of the parties involved are hardly verifiable, and it is not possible to contract a clearly defined research output in advance. The parties negotiate to allocate potential gains, but the collaboration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008683415
Knowledge-intensive activities are bound by imperfections that limit the provision of incentives, particularly asymmetric information about inputs and unclear definition of outputs. Thus, performance-based incentives are not possible. We then model a contract in which the firm can use the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008683420
Incumbent firms, especially in high-tech industries, often contract and collaborate with small research units on single projects. A delicate resulting contracting decision thus is how to allocate control. This paper considers the incumbent's problem to design a research contract that specifies:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010688291