Showing 1 - 10 of 333
This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370673
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408744
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005409211
We show, that Strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasiperfect in every extensive form (with that normal form). Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of suppol ting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005417210
“Buy local” arrangements encourage members of a community or group to patronize one another rather than the external economy. They range from formal mechanisms such as local currencies to informal “I’ll buy from you if you buy from me” arrangements, and are often championed on social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011204503
“Buy local” arrangements encourage members of a community or group to patronize one another rather than the external economy. They range from formal mechanisms such as local currencies to informal “I’ll buy from you if you buy from me” arrangements, and are often championed on social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010819828
This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822921
Different markets are cleared by different types of prices—seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019204
We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one‐sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make. We show that the set of stable outcomes is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011006220