This paper analyzes sorting pattern of risk-sharing partnerships where agents are heterogenous in their income riskiness. When preference belongs to the class of HARA, household production in terms of monetary equivalence is perfectly transferable between spouses. Hence the characterization of...

This paper studies the comparative statics regarding changes in risk on Nash's solution to bargaining games with stochastic outcome and disagreement points. When absolute risk tolerance is linear with constant slope, the Nash's solution to bargaining with risky outcomes and risky disagreement...

A standard risk-sharing matching game predicts negative assortative matching over agents’ risk attitudes. In regards to risk sharing, less risk-averse agents prefer highly risk-averse partners, who pay a high risk premium. Negative sorting is, however, inconsistent with empirical and...

We study a model where an entrant chooses between online and offline markets to compete with an offline-market incumbent. When consumers buy a product from the online market, they cannot inspect the product's quality prior to purchase. Conventional wisdom and some literature suggest that this...

Consumers buying goods online often cannot physically inspect the products prior to purchase. Thus an online market may turn what is usually regarded as a search good into an experience good. We investigate how this feature, together with other features of the marketplace, affects a firms choice...

Whether consumers are aware of potentially adverse product effects is key to private and social incentives to disclose information about undesirable product characteristics. In a monopoly model with a mix of aware and unaware consumers, a larger share of unaware consumers makes information...

We study the incentives for quality provision in a farmer-owned cooperative (co-op) and an investor-owned firm (iof). The quality of the final product is a function of the quality of the inputs, which are determined by the farmers? unobservable efforts. The input qualities are unobservable at...

We show that every (random) assignment/allocation without transfers can be considered as a market outcome with personalized prices and an equal income. One can thus evaluate an assignment by investigating the prices and the induced opportunity sets. When prices are proportional across agents,...

type="main" xml:lang="en" <p>We study optimal contracting by a monopolistic seller of investment goods to a time-inconsistent consumer and, in doing so, introduce asymmetric information to the model of DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004). We find (1) the below-marginal-cost-pricing rule may fail for a...</p>

This paper builds a complete information contest model with endogenous discrimination. We show that a revenue-maximizing contest designer will optimally set a bias towards a weaker contestant against a stronger contestant and completely eliminate the asymmetry between the two. Moreover, in...