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There are several judicial cases under the US environmental law, in which a lending bank is liable for cleaning up environmentally hazardous materials generated by its borrowing firm. Such a liability rule, so-called lender liability, is applied to a lending bank which has been actively involved...
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We consider the role of the nonrecourse financing of securitization by a financial institution (FI). Our model suggests that even though the FI has the opportunity to provide liquidity support afterward, it is optimal for the FI to use the nonrecourse financing of securitization initially,...
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We develop a main bank model where the main bank decides whether or not to raise additional funds from the capital market to continue to invest in a borrowing firm when nonmain banks withdraw funds. We show that the threat of withdrawal of nonmain banks is more likely to force the main bank to...
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We examine renegotiation in a double moral hazard model when both the principal and the agent are allowed to make a renegotiation offer to a self-interested arbitrator at the renegotiation stage even though the principal proposes an initial contract. Under a belief restriction, any...
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The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for supporting desired equilibrium actions in a one-principal, multi-agent model when the principal makes a renegotiation offer. We show that there exists a mechanism in which the principal's most preferred mixed strategy is always supported.
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