We analyze changes in the composition of top management teams when a key member of the team (the chief executive officer [CEO]) departs. We find that the probability of non-CEO top manager turnover increases markedly around times of CEO turnover. Further, the magnitude of this increase depends...

We analyze changes in the composition of top management teams when a key member of the team (the CEO) departs. We find that the probability of non-CEO top manager turnover increases markedly around times of CEO turnover. Further, the magnitude of this increase depends on the relations between...

We investigate the hypothesis that complementarities across co-workers (which may arise from matching or investments in specific skills) affect the value of employment relationships between senior executives and firms. We analyze the changes in the composition of top management teams when a key...

The "Lake Wobegon Effect," which is widely cited as a potential cause for rising CEO pay, is said to occur because no firm wants to admit to having a CEO who is below average, and so no firm allows its CEO's pay package to lag market expectations. We develop a game-theoretic model of this...

Recent research suggests that implicit incentive contracts may be based on performance measures that are observable only to the contracting parties. We derive and test implications of this insight for the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. If corporate boards...