There is now considerable evidence that business cycle variation in output and employment in the U.S. differs in expansions and contractions. We present nonparametric evidence that asymmetries are strongest in durable goods manufacturing. In a Markov switching framework, we find two leading...

This paper proposes to model the error term in smooth transition autoregressive target zone model as Gaussian with stochastic volatility (STARTZ-SV) or as Student-t with GARCH volatility (STARTZ-TGARCH). Using the dynamics of Norwegian krone exchange rate index, we show that both models produce...

Mankiw and Reis (2002) have revived imperfect information explanations for the short run real effects of monetary policy. This paper contrasts their sticky information model with the standard sticky price model. First, I utilize a theoretical relation between aggregate prices and unit labor cost...

Using a laboratory experiment, we investigate whether a variety of behaviors in repeated games are related to an array of individual characteristics that are popular in economics: risk attitude, time preference, trust, trustworthiness, altruism, strategic skills in one-shot matrix games,...

We introduce a novel approach to studying behavior in repeated games - one that is based on the psychology of play. Our approach is based on the following six "aspects" of a player's behavior: round-1 cooperation, lenience, forgiveness, loyalty, leadership, and following. Using a laboratory...

We report an experiment that evaluates three market‐based regimes for triggering the conversion of contingent capital bonds into equity: a “fixed‐trigger” regime, where a price threshold triggers mandatory conversion; a “regulator” regime, where regulators make conversion decisions...

A market experiment examines the capacity of price and information frictions to explain real responses to nominal price shocks. Results indicate that both price and information frictions impede the response to a nominal shock, as predicted by the standard dynamic adjustment models. Observed...

We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">2007</CitationRef>) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator...</citationref>

We present the results of an experiment designed to identify more clearly the motivation underlying dictators’ behavior. In the typical dictator game, recipients are given no endowment. We give an endowment to the recipient as well as the dictator. This new dimension allows us to test directly...