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In competition law, the problem of the optimal design of institutional and procedural rules concerns assessment processes of the pro- and anticompetitiveness of business behaviors. This is well recognized in the discussion about the relative merits of different assessment principles such as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003681
Although both in US antitrust and European competition law there is a clear evolution to a much broader application of "rule of reason" (instead of per-se rules), there is also an increasing awareness of the problems of a case-by-case approach. The "error costs approach" (minimizing the sum of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785155
The US Supreme Court’s overruling of the pre-existing per se illegality of resale price maintenance and the recommendation of a rule of reason approach in the Leegin decision (2007), raise the question whether other jurisdictions should follow this approach and what future assessments of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003680
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790
Abschreckungseigenschaften eines wettbewerbspolitischen Systems. Auf der Grundlage der ökonomischen Theorie der Rechtsdurchsetzung werden mehrere … basis of the economic theory of law enforcement we identify several factors that are likely to affect its degree of … Wettbewerbspolitik zu unterscheiden.<i> …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008578200
basis of the economic theory of law enforcement we identify several factors that are likely to affect its degree of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633331
Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organized crime by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Optimally designed "courageous" leniency programs reward the first party that reports with the fines paid by all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005329023
Since the introduction of a formal commitments procedure in EU an- titrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003), the European Commission has extensively settled cases of alleged anticompetitive practices. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement (Be- bchuk, 1984; Shavell,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011246329
In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084408
The article makes a literature review on the theory of Leniency Programs for cartels prosecution. We focus on how these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005009886