In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders’ types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a...

The literature on R&D contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their innovation regardless of its value. This ignores a potential adverse selection problem. The present paper analyzes the procurement of innovations when the procurer cannot commit to never bargain with innovators who...

This paper analyzes decentralized wage bargaining in a unionized oligopoly industry. The novel features of the proposed model are that firms are subject to incomplete information concerning their cost and that wages may signal firms’ private information. The potential for signaling exerts an...

We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect of merging with a takeover target and bidders can influence rivals' beliefs through their bids. We compare cash and profit-share auctions, first- and second-price, supplemented...

In a sequence of first-price auctions with stable private values bidders strategically conceal their private information until the last auction. We characterize equilibrium bidding and explore how such signal jamming affects the dynamics of equilibrium prices.

We consider takeover bidding in a Cournot oligopoly when firms have private information concerning the synergy effect of merging with a takeover target. Two auction rules are considered: standard first-price and profit-share auctions, supplemented by entry fees. Since non-merged firms benefit...

The issue of the credit crunch in the aftermath of the Asian crisis has stimulated much debate. Indeed, some features of the East Asian economies, such as bank-based financial systems and high leverage, make them particularly vulnerable to monetary and financial shocks. Under such circumstances,...