We jointly measure the persuasive effects of slanted news and tastes for like-minded news. The key ingredient is using channel positions as exogenous shifters of cable news viewership. Local cable positions affect viewership by cable subscribers. They do not correlate with viewership by local...

This paper studies time inconsistency, asymmetric information, and political ideology in natural monopoly regulation of electricity distribution companies. Empirically, more conservative political environments have higher regulated rates of return and worse operational efficiency as measured by...

This paper investigates the rise in shortages of sterile injectable pharmaceutical drugs in the US. I examine a policy change in 2005 that differentially reduced Medicare Part B payments for pharmaceuticals. Drugs whose payments dropped more due to the policy change have had greater increases in...

We measure how the bundling of television channels affects short-run welfare. We estimate an industry model of viewership, demand, pricing, bundling, and input-market bargaining using data on ratings, purchases, prices, bundles, and input costs. We conduct simulations of a la carte policies that...

We measure how the bundling of television channels affects welfare. We estimate an industry model of viewership, demand, pricing, bundling, and input market bargaining using data on ratings, purchases, prices, bundles, and input costs. We conduct simulations of à la carte policies that require...

We investigate the welfare effects of vertical integration in U.S. multichannel television markets. Vertical integration in this market can enhance efficiency by aligning investment incentives and/or reducing double marginalization, but can also increase market power by encouraging raising...

This paper explores the application of oblivious equilibrium to concentrated industries. We define an extended notion of oblivious equilibrium that we call partially oblivious equilibrium (POE) that allows for there to be a set of "dominant firms'', whose firm states are always monitored by...

We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural...

We propose an approximation method for analyzing Ericson and Pakes (1995)-style dynamic models of imperfect competition. We develop a simple algorithm for computing an ``oblivious equilibrium,'' in which each firm is assumed to make decisions based only on its own state and knowledge of the long...