We discuss large but finite linear market games which are represented as minima of finitely many measures. These games describe markets in which the agents decompose into finitely many disjoint groups each of which holds a corner of the market. Most solution concepts like the core, the Shapley...

This paper constitutes the third part in a series dealing with vNM-Stable Sets, see J. Rosenmüller, "Convex vNM-Stable Sets for a Semi Orthogonal Game. Part I" [IMW Working Paper no. 483 (2013)], "Convex vNM-Stable Sets for a Semi Orthogonal Game. Part II" [IMW Working Paper no. 498 (2014)]. We...

This paper constitutes the second part in a series dealing with vNM-Stable sets for (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players, see J. Rosenmüller, "Convex vNM-Stable Sets for a Semi Orthogonal Game. Part I" [IMW Working Paper no. 483 (2013)]. The coalitional function is...

We consider (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r + 1 “production factors” that is, non atomic measures defined on an interval. r of these are orthogonal probabilities which, economically, can be considered as...

Within this paper we establish the existence of a vNM-Stable Set for (cooperative) linear production games with a continuum of players. The coalitional function is generated by r+1 "production factors" (non atomic measures). r factors are given by orthogonal probabilities ("cornered" production...

The Maschler Perles Solution is the unique bargaining solution which is superadditive and satisfies the usual covariance properties. We provide two proofs for supperadditivity that do not rely on the standard traveling time.