The implicit assumption made when deterrence solutions to repeated games are constructed, is that perfectness is a sufficient condition for the credibility of threats. In this paper it is shown that the validity of this assumption hinges on another assumption which proves to be unsatisfactory -...

This paper provides a model of natural resource exploration, where the sole motivation to explore arises from a strategic incentive to preempt competitors. It is assumed that private ownership rights over a finite unexplored and commonly held resource stock can be established through a costly...

In a general equilibrium model, international lending through a non-sovereign financial intermediary (a banking system) to a sovereign borrower is analyzed. Under very pessimistic assumptions, including a principal-agency type of incentive to load future intermediation with certain bancrupcy for...

A situation is analysed in which two countries negotiate the financing of the incremental costs which accrue if one of them switches from a non-sustainable onto a sustainable development path. The other country's incentive to pay arises as it benefits from the developing country's environmental...

A sovereign debtor facing a credit limit due to unenforceable debt contracts may have an incentive to increase its creditworthiness by making itself subject to more severe sanctions in response to a debt repudiation. It is shown that for a natural resources exporting country this incentive may...

The deterrence equilibrium concept of an important class of repeated games is shown to suffer from an unsoluble rational ity versus credibility conflict. The implicit assumption made when de terrence solutions to repeated games are constructed is that perfectn ess is a suffi-cient condition for...