This paper develops a general equilibrium model of technological adoption in an economy populated by 'satisficing' entrepreneurs whose main objective is to minimise innovative effort while keeping the firm alive. In such an economy, product market competition is shown to have a stimulating...

In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between formal...

This paper considers a buyer-seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and/or random utility parameters. In such situations, it is known that contract renegotiation may prevent the implementation of first-best outcomes. In this paper, we show however that efficient...

This paper develops a general equilibrium model of technological adoption in an economy populated by 'satisficing' entrepreneurs whose main objective is to minimise innovative effort while keeping the firm alive. In such an economy, product market competition is shown to have a stimulating...

This paper develops an agency model in which firms can influence their own incentives to provide a non-contractible effort by contracting on other variables (e.g. by committing themselves to some verifiable investment). In such a model the firms' need for outside finance is shown to interact...