We study dominant strategy incentive compatibility in a mechanism design setting with contingent contracts where the payoff of each agent is observed by the principal and can be contracted upon. Our main focus is on the class of linear contracts (one of the most commonly used contingent...

A large economics literature seeks to understand the reasons why individuals make charitable contributions. Fundamental features of most models of charitable giving are the inclusion of externalities induced by other agents and the Lancasterian characteristics approach to specifying utility...

We examine a model of dynamic screening and price discrimination in which the seller has limited commitment power. Two cohorts of anonymous, patient, and risk-neutral buyers arrive over two periods. Buyers in the first cohort arrive in period one, are privately informed about the distribution of...

Practical or legal constraints often restrict auctions to being symmetric (anonymous and nondiscriminatory). We examine when this restriction prevents a seller from achieving his objectives. In an independent private value setting with heterogenous buyers, we characterize the set of incentive...

We study mechanism design in a setting where agents know their types but are uncertain about the utility from any alternative. The final realized utility of each agent is observed by the principal and can be contracted upon. In such environments, the principal is not restricted to using only...

We study mechanism design in a setting where agents know their types but are uncertain about the utility from any alternative. The lnal realized utility of each agent is observed by the principal and can be contracted upon. In such environments, the principal is not restricted to using only...

In this paper, we examine how the geometry underlying revealed preference determines the set of preferences that can be revealed by choices. Specifically, given an arbitrary binary relation defined on a finite set, we ask if and when there exists a data set which can generate the given relation...

<Para ID="Par1">We develop revealed preference tests for models of multi-product oligopoly, building on the work in Carvajal et al. (Econometrica 81(6):2351–2379, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2013</CitationRef>). We analyze a Cournot model with multiple goods and show that it has testable restrictions when at least one good is produced by two or more...</citationref></para>

This paper presents a nonparametric model of interdependent preferences, where an individual's consumption may act as an externality on the preferences of other consumers. We assume that individual price consumption data is observed for all consumers. It is known that the general consumption...