Showing 1 - 7 of 7
We present a short, geometric proof for the price-of-anarchy results that have recently been established in a series of papers on selfish routing in multicommodity flow networks and on nonatomic congestion games. This novel proof also facilitates two new types of theoretical results: On the one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413533
Local search algorithms for combinatorial optimization problems are in general of pseudopolynomial running time and polynomial-time algorithms are often not known for finding locally optimal solutions for NP-hard optimization problems. We introduce the concept of epsilon-local optimality and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005458459
In project scheduling, a set of precedence-constrained jobs has to be scheduled so as to minimize a given objective. In resource-constrained project scheduling, the jobs additionally compete for scarce resources. Due to its universality, the latter problem has a variety of applications in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005574700
We study the problem of minimizing the maximum latency of flows in networks with congestion. We show that this problem is NP-hard, even when all arc latency functions are linear and there is a single source and sink. Still, one can prove that an optimal flow and an equilibrium flow share a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750543
We consider the scheduling problem of minimizing the average weighted completion time on identical parallel machines when jobs are arriving over time. For both the preemptive and the nonpreemptive setting, we show that straightforward extensions of Smith's ratio rule yield smaller competitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750696
In project scheduling, a set of precedence-constrained jobs has to be scheduled so as to minimize a given objective. In resource-constrained project scheduling, the jobs additionally compete for scarce resources. Due to its universality, the latter problem has a variety of applications in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009214730
According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly, a behavior that is captured by the Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. A Nash equilibrium does not optimize any global criterion per se, and so there is no apparent reason why...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450589