This paper models the accession process to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a two stage game. In the first stage, member countries choose tariff rates to be applied on trade with each other. In the second stage a non-member country applies for membership in the agreement and negotiates with...

This paper develops a growth model aimed at understanding the potential effects of globalization of production on rate of innovation, distribution of skilled labor income between the North and South, and welfare of skilled workers in both regions. We adopt a dynamic general equilibrium...

We derive a simple equation to calculate the global welfare impact of the simultaneous reduction of trade costs between multiple country-pairs. Interestingly, we find that we obtain the same equation for a broad class of trade models. Moreover, balanced trade is mostly not required for the...

We construct a tractable general equilibrium model of cumulative innovation and growth, in which new ideas strictly improve upon frontier technologies, and productivity improvements are drawn in a stochastic manner. The presence of positive knowledge spillovers implies that the decentralized...

This paper develops a growth model aimed at understanding the effects of globalization of production on rate of innovation, distribution of labor income between the North and South and welfare of workers in both regions. We adopt a dynamic general equilibrium product cycle model, assuming that...

Price controls create opportunities for international arbitrage. Many have argued that such arbitrage, if tolerated, will undermine intellectual property rights and dull the incentives for investment in research-intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals. We challenge this orthodox view and...

We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size, in their capacities for innovation and in their absolute and comparative advantage in...