The Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I surely ranks among the most costly of diplomatic failures, a “peace to end all peace” (Fromkin, 1992). After he directly contributed to some of the early mistakes made by the American delegation, Walter Lippmann observed these errors...

The authors examine how negotiators' risk preferences influence the formation of coalitions. Joining a coalition may either increase or mitigate risk depending on the nature of the bargaining problem. In an experimental setting, the authors test whether relative risk preferences influence the...

Important decisions are often determined by group vote. Institutional provisions may stipulate who has the authority to determine the group's agenda. According to cooperative game theory, this privilege gives the leader a great deal of power to control the outcome. In a series of experiments,...

The success of a negotiated agreement depends on implementation and implications for future exchange between the parties. This paper examines structural, affective and contractual factors that influence implementation behavior. Predictions derived from contract theory and recent negotiation...