Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? If the answer to these questions were positive, as suggested in recent work...

In this note, we propose a simple infinite horizon of elections with two candidates. We suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party...

This paper contributes to the heated debate on the link between climate and civil war. We exploit a large dataset of a drought index commonly used in hydrology, the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI). The PDSI is based on a hydrological model and is a cumulative measure that takes account of...

This paper contributes to the heated debate on the link between climate and civil war. We exploit a large dataset of a drought index commonly used in hydrology, the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI). The PDSI is based on a hydrological model and is a cumulative measure that takes account of...

Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? Recent work answers by the affirmative — Groseclose (1999), Ansolabehere...

Using original data collected from 1,500 farmers in Burkina Faso in 2013, we show that individual risk and time preferences play a central role in grain storage decisions. We use a sample selection model as well as a structural estimation approach. Both of them lead to results that are very...

We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players, contestants are allowed to reduce the effort of the opponent....

This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can...

In modern democracies, common wisdom suggests that political parties alternate in power due to voters' disappointment. The aim of this paper is to show that parties' turnover may be due to voters' "satisfaction." Our model is built on two main assumptions: Parties "own" different issues, and...