We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state in non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games.

This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze the firms' incentives to preannounce their new products. We consider a two-period model where a single firm controls the market with one product in the first period and a new and better product is introduced in the second period, either by the...

This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all...

This note analyzes the effect of product complementarity in a bilateral oligopoly. We show that offers of traders on the two sides of the market are strategic complements (substitutes) if and only if the two goods are substitutes (complements). The outcome of the bilateral oligopoly game...