The efficiency implications of different property right allocations when two environmental goods can be produced under the condition of economies of scope are analysed. It is assumed that an environmental agency - acting on behalf of the community - employs an auction-based mechanism to buy...

The efficiency implications of different property right allocations when two environmental goods can be produced under the condition of economies of scope are analysed. It is assumed that an environmental agency – acting on behalf of the community – employs an auction‐based mechanism to...

In this paper, we develop a formal model that combines point-source emitters of waste, with landholders that can provide pollution-offset activities, in one ‘environment economy’. We use the model to demonstrate the societal benefits of such a system relative to a stand-alone tradable permit...

Australia is subject to widespread droughts, with significant financial implications for agricultural producers, regional, state and national economies. Most economic assessments conclude there is no economic efficiency case for governments to provide drought assistance. However, significant...

In this paper we present results of a statistical analysis of 380 landholders in the North Central and North East regions in Victoria that were interviewed after the first bidding round of the BushTender scheme. This survey asked questions about the economic, attitudinal and demographic factors...

Most economic assessments conclude there is no economic efficiency case for governments to provide drought assistance. However, significant public funds are allocated to farmers during droughts and there is a second-best case to improve drought policy design. In this article we show that the...

The present paper proposes that markets for nature conservation on private land are missing because of the problem of asymmetric information. An auction of conservation contracts was designed to reveal hidden information needed to facilitate meaningful transactions between landholders and...

The present paper proposes that markets for nature conservation on private land are missing because of the problem of asymmetric information. An auction of conservation contracts was designed to reveal hidden information needed to facilitate meaningful transactions between landholders and...

In this paper we explain the economic evaluation system developed by economists―in conjunction with senior managers―for the Department of Natural Resources and Environment’s Agriculture Division. This evaluation system has two components: qualitative and quantitative. The former focuses...