Showing 1 - 10 of 165
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005493149
We analyze reciprocal market sharing agreements by which firms commit not to enter each other's territory in oligopolistic markets and procurement auctions. The set of market sharing agreements defines a collusive network. We characterize stable collusive networks when firms and markets are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005401004
When firms can supply several separate markets, collusion can take two forms. Either firms establish production quotas on all the markets, or they share markets. This paper compares production quotas and market sharing agreements in a Cournot duopoly where firms incur a fixed cost for serving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008497
This paper analyzes the formation of market sharing agreements among firms in oligopolistic markets and procurement auctions. The set of market sharing agreements defines a collusive network, and the paper provides a complete characterization of stable and efficient collusive networks when firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101771
This paper investigates the relation between asymmetries in the distribution of shares in joint ventures and asymmetries between the parent companies. When the joint venture and the parent companies are controlled by separate entities, we provide a simple formula to compute the optimal ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101772
In a Cournot duopoly where firms incur a fixed cost for serving each market, collusion is easier to sustain with production quotas if the fixed cost is small enough, and with market sharing agreements if it is large enough.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005158891
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010675058
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010704208
Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state in non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478947
This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze the firms' incentives to preannounce their new products. We consider a two-period model where a single firm controls the market with one product in the first period and a new and better product is introduced in the second period, either by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474567