We consider an economy where firms operate in an imperfectly competitive industry and mutually affect each others' investment opportunities. Each firm is assumed to face a mutually exclusive choice of investing in either a short- or a long-term project. For example, firm i's commitment to a...

We analyze a stylized distribution channel (bilateral monopoly) model where an upstream manufacturer sells output to a downstream retailer. In a two‐stage linear demand game setting, we show that a two‐part contract, consisting of a wholesale price and corporate social responsibility (CSR)...

<title>Abstract</title><italic>We analyze a simple two-period linear demand durable-goods monopoly model with "self-sabotage." The firm has the ability to sabotage its own production by increasing its future (period two) manufacturing costs. We find that an uncommitted monopoly seller has an incentive to engage in...</italic>

We suppose that guns or firearms are subject to an anticipated future buyback program undertaken by the government. A simple linear demand durable-goods monopoly model is then analyzed where the durable-good manufactured is a firearm that lasts for two-periods. The model is calibrated so that...

We analyze a simple linear demand bilateral monopoly situation where one of the firms, either the up-stream manufacturer or the down-stream retailer, is socially concerned in terms of its desire to enhance its end-customers’ welfare in addition to the traditional profit motive. Two cases are...

A simple linear demand two-period durable goods is analyzed where the durable good is provided by private non-profit organization (NPO). A novel flexible objective function is utilized that allows for both the “commercial” and “social concern” aspects of NPOs. The model indicates NPO’s...

Since many publicly owned firms manufacture a durable product we examine a simple two-period, constant returns technology, durability choice monopoly model under public ownership. Various types of firm commitment ability are analyzed. The model suggests that many of the standard results of...

Conventional duopoly models typically assume agents possess specific conjectures concerning other agents' behavior. In this paper equilibrium conjectures are endogenous and are a result of a joint factor market and product market equilibrium. Factor markets affect product markets since potential...

Utilizing a model that allows for the welfare of the commercial NPO's stakeholders directly in terms of their consumer surplus, and indirectly in terms of NPO profits, we explore the impact of changes in the NPO's "social concern" for consumers on market efficiency. Three separate Cournot mixed...