Barbera and Levy offer contrasting assessments of the U.S. economy of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Barbera suggests that the behavior of the economy was typical for the early part of a recessionary stage in a standard business cycle: Policymakers and business leaders, believing the downturn...

The question of central bank independence is one of degree. A completely independent central bank is impossible as long as a country has provisions for altering central bank powers, even if that requires constitutional amendments. On the other hand, any central bank has at least some discretion...

A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....

A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....

We report results from a simultaneous bilateral bargaining experiment with attention to the effects of a settlement bonus on strategic decision-making behavior. In instances with a sufficiently large settlement bonus, truthful revelation emerges as the dominant strategy. However previous work...

Diverging from the historical precedent of using a midpoint rule (k=½) to experimentally structure two-person bargaining under incomplete information, extreme values of k (k={0, 1}) are invoked in an asymmetric information environment endowing one player with exclusive price-setting power and...