Showing 1 - 10 of 170
This paper studies the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions in which there is a trade-off between (i) the short-run gain of using information, and (ii) the long-run gain of concealing it. We implement simple examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010820761
This paper studies the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions in which there is a trade-off between (i) the short-run gain of using information, and (ii) the long-run gain of concealing it. We implement simple examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010784114
This paper studies experimentally the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions with asymmetric information. We implement in the laboratory three examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring. The stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836522
This paper studies experimentally the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions with asymmetric information. We implement in the laboratory three examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring. The stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008788683
This paper studies the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions in which there is a trade-off between (i) the short-run gain of using information, and (ii) the long-run gain of concealing it. We implement simple examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608398
This paper reports two laboratory studies designed to study the impact of public information about past departure rates on congestion levels and travel costs. Our experimental design is based on a discrete version of Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey’s (1990) bottleneck model where subjects have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005523779
This paper analyzes a model of sequential parimutuel betting described as a two-horse race with a finite number of noise bettors and a finite number of strategic and symmetrically informed bettors. For generic objective probabilities that the favorite wins the race, a unique subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005422834
This paper examines strategic information revelation in a Cournot duopoly with incomplete information about firm~1\'s cost and information precision. Firm~2 relies on certifiable and ex post submissions of firm~1, without necessarily knowing whether firm~1 knows its cost or not. The sequential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005422863
This paper provides a general model for the study of strategic knowledge sharing in any finite Bayesian game. Unlike earlier papers on strategic information revelation, higher-order uncertainties can be incorporated into the model. We propose an equilibrium concept, called knowledge equilibrium,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385245
Parikh and Krasucki (1990) suggested in an informal manner that a consensus does not require common knowledge. Weyers (1992) proved that their model does not permit such a conclusion and that a more general one has to be constructed. Heifetz (1996) gave an example with three agents inspired by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385252