We focus on axiomatizations of the Pareto equilibrium concept in multicriteria games based on consistency.Axiomatizations of the Nash equilibrium concept by Peleg and Tijs (1996) and Peleg, Potters, and Tijs (1996) have immediate generalizations.The axiomatization of Norde et al.(1996) cannot be...

In this paper the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games is analysed. It turns out that the classical result for the set of equilibria for bimatrix games, that it is a finite union of polytopes, is only valid for multicriteria games if one of the players only has...

The Shapley-Ichiishi result states that a game is convex if and only if the convex hull of marginal vectors equals the core. In this paper we generalize this result by distinguishing equivalence classes of balanced games that share the same core structure. We then associate a system of linear...

In this paper we present a generalization of the Shapley-Ichiishi result for convex games to the class of all exact games. Then we discuss two applications to the class of convex games. First we show that it can indeed be used to give an alternative proof of the Shapley-Ichiishi result. Secondly...

Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...