We analyze financial risk premiums and real economic dynamics in a DSGE model with three types of agents - shareholders, bondholders and workers - that differ in participation in the capital market and in terms of risk aversion. Aggregate productivity and distribution risk are shared among these...

We analyze financial risk premiums and real economic dynamics in a DSGE model with three types of agents - shareholders, bondholders and workers - that differ in participation in the capital market and in attitude towards risk and intertemporal sub- stitution. Aggregate productivity and...

We analyze financial risk premiums and real economic dynamics in a DSGE model with three types of agents - shareholders, bondholders and workers - that differ in participation in the capital market and in attitude towards risk and intertemporal substitution. Aggregate productivity and...

We analyze financial risk premiums and real economic dynamics in a DSGE model with three types of agents--shareholders, bondholders and workers--that differ in participation in the capital market and in attitude towards risk and intertemporal substitution. Aggregate productivity and distribution...

By expanding the macro part of macro-finance models, historical fluctuations in US bond yields turn out to be largely consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis. We estimate a medium-scale macro-finance DSGE model of the term structure to establish this. Our finding contrasts with...

We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers' bargaining power in the hours negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more...

We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers’ bargaining power in the hours negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more...

We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated for each period. The workers' bargaining power in the working time negotiations affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i)...

We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage bargaining where hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers' bargaining power in the hours negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero this parameter, (i) the more...

We build a model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage bargaining and we assume that hours worked are negotiated every period. We analyze the role of workers? bargaining power in the hours negotiation on unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero is this...