Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is one of the most popular multi-attribute decision aid methods. However, within AHP, there are several competing preference measurement scales and aggregation techniques. In this paper, we compare these possibilities using a decision problem with an inherent...

In this paper, we use experimental economics methods to test how well Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) fares as a choice support system in a real decision problem. AHP provides a ranking that we statistically compare with three additional rankings given by the subjects in the experiment: one at...

Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is one of the most popular multi-attribute decision aid methods. However, results depend on the preference measurement sacle and the aggregation technique used. In this paper, we describe a decision problem with an inherent trade-off between two criteria. A...

Economic classroom experiments are an excellent way to increase student interest, but getting started may be difficult. We attempt to aid the newcomer by recommending which experiments to use and describing the current resources available.

Once relegated to cinema or history lectures, bank runs have become a modern phenomenon that captures the interest of students. We use a simple classroom experiment based upon the Diamond-Dybvig Model (1983) to demonstrate how a bank run, a seemingly irrational event, can occur rationally. We...

Should lenders be made liable for environmental damages caused by their customers? In a recent paper Pitchford studied the case where the customer is a wealth-constrained manager-owned firm. He argued convincingly that a joint liability of lender and firm may reduce the firm's incentive to...

Kohlberg and Mertens argued that a solution concept to a game should be invariant under the addition of deletion of an equivalent strategy and not require the use of weakly dominated strategies. In this paper we study which of these requirements are satisfied by Kalai and Samet's concepts of...

We introduce notions of evolutionary stability for sets of strategies based on the following requirements: After every sufficiently small mutation of a population playing a single strategy in the set: a) No single mutant strategy can spread. b) A single mutant strategy not in the set will be...