We introduce a model of tourism choice where we consider that the choice of a tourism resort by a tourist, depends not only on the characteristics of the product offered by the resort but depends also on certain characteristics -crowding types- of the other tourists that have chosen the same...

We analyze the constituents stocks of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA30) and the Standard & Poor's 100 index (S&P100) of the NYSE stock exchange market. Surprisingly, we discover the data collapse of the histograms of the DJIA30 price fluctuations and of the S&P100 price fluctuations to...

We study the problem of determination of asset prices in an incomplete market proposing three different but related scenarios. One scenario uses a market game approach whereas the other two are based on risk sharing or regret minimizing considerations. Dynamical schemes modeling the convergence...

We compute the analytic expression of the probability distributions F{FTSE100,+} and F{FTSE100,-} of the normalized positive and negative FTSE100 (UK) index daily returns r(t). Furthermore, we define the alpha re-scaled FTSE100 daily index positive returns r(t)^alpha and negative returns...

In terms of the stock exchange returns, we compute the analytic expression of the probability distributions F{DAX,+} and F{DAX,-} of the normalized positive and negative DAX (Germany) index daily returns r(t). Furthermore, we define the alpha re-scaled DAX daily index positive returns r(t)^alpha...

We compute the analytic expression of the probability distributions F{AEX,+} and F{AEX,-} of the normalized positive and negative AEX (Netherlands) index daily returns r(t). Furthermore, we define the \alpha re-scaled AEX daily index positive returns r(t)^\alpha and negative returns...

In this paper, we propose a perfect competition test which checks whether arbitrarily small coalitions of firms, which behave strategically on costs, are able to manipulate prices in their own benefit. We apply this test to economies with a continuum of differentiated producers. We show that,...

Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant game-theoretic model of an economy with one private good and one public good. Strategies of players consist of voluntary contributions of the private good to public good production. Without relying on first order conditions, the authors...

Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) provides an elegant gametheoretic model of an economy with one private good and one public good. Strategies of players consist of voluntary contributions of the private good to public good production. Without relying on first order conditions, the authors...

We consider consumers with the same reservation price, who desire to buy at most one unit of a good. Firms compete only in prices but there are other features firms cannot control that would eventually lead an agent to buy in one firm or another. We introduce such uncertainty in a model of a...