We present a dynamic model of noncontractual litigation in which the parties’ decision whether to litigate depends on information produced by courts and, vice versa, the courts’ involvement in the lawmaking process depends on the cases proposed by the parties. Thereby, we integrate in one...

We present a dynamic model of noncontractual litigation in which the parties' decision whether to litigate depends on information produced by courts and, vice versa, the courts' involvement in the lawmaking process depends on the cases proposed by the parties. Thereby, we integrate in one model...

We study the relations between compensation schemes and risk aversion of managers in a strategic framework. We first show that the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in compensation contracts reduces the equilibrium profits of Cournot firms if managers are not too risk averse. Second,...

Shavell (1980) established that tort regimes fail to incentivize optimal activity levels. The bearer of residual loss adopts a socially optimal activity level; however, the nonbearer of residual loss will adopt an excessive level. We explore alternative liability rules, which distribute the cost...

The quest for benefit from existing wealth or by seeking privileged benefit through influence over policy is known as rent seeking. Much rent seeking activity involves government and political decisions and is therefore in the domain of political economy, although it can also take place in...

The increase of legal aids in the justice budget and the reduction of state expenses with respect to Access to Law brought the legislator to develop legal insurance. Two questions follow from the private access to law. Firstly, legal insurance and legal aids are they similar in the access to...

Shavell (1980) established that all existing tort regimes fail to incentivize optimal activity levels. The bearer of residual loss adopts a socially optimal activity level, however the non-bearer of residual loss will adopt an excessive level of activity. In this paper, we explore alternative...

We study a rent-seeking proprtional-prize contest between two heterogeneously risk-averse players and given prize amounts are normally distributed rather than known ex ante. We establish existence and unicity of a Nash equilibrium linked to this contest, and study the equilibrium e_orts implied....

We study a rent-seeking proprtional-prize contest between two heterogeneously risk-averse players and given prize amounts are normally distributed rather than known ex ante. We establish existence and unicity of a Nash equilibrium linked to this contest, and study the equilibrium e_orts implied....

We study the relations between compensation schemes and risk aversion of managers in a strategic framework. We first show that the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in compensation contracts reduces the equilibrium profits of Cournot firms if managers are not too risk averse. Second,...