This paper follows the interpretation of the bankruptcy problems in terms of TU games given in O'Neill (1982). In this context we propose the analysis of the Transition Game associated to each bankruptcy problem. We explore an old solution described by Ibn Ezra in the XII century. Firstly, we...

In 1950, Nash's seminal paper introduced the axiomatic approach to the analysis of bargaining situations. Since then, many bargaining solutions have appeared and been axiomatically analyzed. The fact that agents, when face a bargaining problem, can come up with different solution concepts (that...

This paper explores the introduction of a variable critical-level in a variable population context. We focus the attention on the "Critical- Level Egalitarian Ruleî, a social evaluation procedure which compares two social states as follows: (i) It reproduces the leximin criterion when applied...

Consider a two-person bargaining problem, where both agents have a particular notion of what would be a just solution outcome. In case their opinions differ, a procedure which leads to a compromise between t,he two different views is needed. In this paper we propose a mechanism to solve this...

The solution for the "Contested Garment Problem" proposed in the BabylonicTalmud, one of the most important sources of inspiration for solving situations where demand overcomes supply of some resources, suggests that each agent should receive at least some part of the available amount when...

This paper studies the sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures formany-to-one-real-life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing thestudent´ optimal allocation in subgame perfect equibrium.

This paper introduces a property over agents' preferences, called Tops Responsiveness Condition. Such a property guarantees that the core in Hedonic Coalition Formation games is not empty. It is also shown that a mechanism exists that selects a stable allocation. It turns out that this...

This paper studies simple hiring procedures for job markets. We show that when agents act strategically only individually rational outcomes should be expected. Moreover, If agents can form unions, thereby gaining the possibility to commit on the decision to be chosen, only stable allocations are...

This paper explores an old solution for bankruptcy problems, described by Ibn Ezra in the XII century. Particularly, we introduce a new way of extending the Ibn Ezra’s proposal, the Generalized Ibn Ezra solution, by imposing that the general distribution principle from which it is inspired...