This paper shows that the efficiency bound for communication equilibria identified by Goltsman et al. (2009) in the …

We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …

. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries, a …

This paper studies coalition formation and payoff division in apex games under the following assumptions: first, payoff … division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition … can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions).In contrast with the results of other …

countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …

benefit – and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game theory that underpins the social learning literature. An …

communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, self enforcing and incentive compatible …

notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. (2) The negotiation process is formalized by a "graph", which serves as a natural … extension to the approach that models preplay communication by an extensive game. …