This paper examines the effects of compensatory-discrimination policies in a caste-based segregated economy where some high-paid positions in a certain industry are reserved for low-caste insiders as a consequence of the implementation of the policies. Cultural attitudes towards preferences for...

The projection dynamic is an evolutionary dynamic for population games. It is derived from a model of individual choice in which agents abandon their current strategies at rates inversely proportional to the strategies' current levels of use. The dynamic admits a simple geometric definition, its...

We investigate a variety of connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. At interior population states, the standard microfoundations for the replicator dynamic can be converted into foundations for the projection dynamic by replacing imitation of opponents with...

We consider group formation in the joint liability setting in microfinance. Joint liability imposes additional liability of having to repay for group partners should they fail to repay. Multiple group membership allows diversification of that risk, and therefore, is welfare enhancing for risk...

We define the logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy spaces and establish its fundamental properties, i.e. the existence, uniqueness and continuity of solutions. We apply the dynamic to the analysis of the Burdett and Judd (1983) model of price dispersion. Our objective is to assess...

We study evolution in Bayesian supermodular population games. We define such games in the context of large populations of agents and establish the existence of a maximum and a minimum pure strategy Nash equilibria which are monotone in types. To study evolution in such games, we introduce...

We study reinforcement learning in a population game. Agents in a population game revise mixed strategies using the Cross rule of reinforcement learning. The population state—the probability distribution over the set of mixed strategies—evolves according to the replicator continuity equation...

In this paper, we model welfare implications of entry of commercial microfinance institutions (MFIs). We initially characterize equilibrium with a sole fund-constrained benevolent credit institution followed by equilibrium with only profit-motivated MFIs. We show that entry of such MFIs can lead...

In this paper we test the hypothesis of whether the presence of increasing number of microfinance institutions leads to over-borrowing. Some recent theoretical literature suggests that, in a joint liability setting, borrowers are more likely to borrow from multiple sources – without increasing...

Purpose – This article aims to provide an exposition of evolutionary game theory which can be used for pedagogical purposes. Design/methodology/approach – The exposition is presented as a mathematical model in order to cover the formal underpinnings of evolutionary game theory. The paper...