Showing 1 - 10 of 207
To end a financial crisis, the central bank is to lend freely, against good collateral, at a high rate, according to Bagehot’s Rule. We argue that in theory and in practice there is a missing ingredient to Bagehot’s Rule: secrecy. Re-creating confidence requires that the central bank lend in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010892259
(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo calculamos los efectos iniciales de la Unión Monetaria Europea (UME) en el comercio internacional. Empleamos un conjunto de datos de panel que incluye la información más actualizada sobre el comercio internacional de 22 países...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005528504
In this paper we estimate the early effect of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on trade. We use a panel data set that includes the most recent information on bilateral trade for 22 developed countries from 1992 through 2002. During this period 12 European countries formally entered into a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005528617
In this paper we estimate the early effect of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on trade. We use a panel data set that includes the most recent information on bilateral trade for 22 developed countries from 1992 through 2002. During this period 12 European countries formally entered into a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010943638
It is well known that movements in lending rates are asymmetric; they rise quickly and sharply, but fall slowly and gradually. Not known is the fact that the asymmetry is stronger the less developed a country's financial system is. This new fact is here documented and explained in a model with an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973915
Concerns about constructing and maintaining good reputations are known to reduce borrowers' excessive risk-taking. However, I find that the self-discipline induced by these concerns is fragile, and can break down without obvious changes in economic fundamentals. Furthermore, in the aggregate,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973916
Scapegoating is often said to be a source of inefficiency in organizations. In this paper, I analyze the consequences of scapegoating within a firm in a model where reputation concerns drive the actions of superiors. Consider delegation choices, for example. Hiring efficient workers may be a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973917
While economic and redistributive policies can be welfare enhancing in an environment characterized by market failures and inequality, they frequently generate private gains to those who hold public office. In a setting with dispersed information about the policies' true motives we ask how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011081560
Industry-level time series data suggest that low-skilled workers get less insurance within the firm than high-skilled workers. In particular, wages respond relatively more to productivity shocks in low-skilled industries than high-skilled industries. Our theory is that low-skilled workers get...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042884
Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these concerns depends on the behavior of other borrowers, rendering the reputational discipline fragile and subject to breakdowns without obvious changes in economic fundamentals....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019205