We construct a model to show that outsourcing of a crucial input can occur even though it can be produced in-house at a lower cost. There are two firms producing differentiated goods and competing in prices, and only one of them possesses input production technology which is superior to that of...

This paper seeks to show that even though a product market competitor holds the least cost input production technology, it may outsource its input production to an independent input producer and buy inputs from the firm at a higher price instead of producing inputs in-house for itself....

We analyze the outsourcing decision of a firm for a key input of a final good production to an independent input supplier even though the firm has an option of producing that key input in-house at a lower cost with a better technology. We find that for smaller technology gap with the independent...

We consider a monopolistic screening model of patent licensing. There is one patentee and one licensee and the patentee wishes to sell a patent of cost reducing technology to the licensee. The patentee is an outsider and the licensee is the only firm in the product market. The licensee possesses...

In the literature of patent licensing, most of the studies are done where new technology is transferred from a cost-efficient firm (patentee) to a less efficient firm (licensee). However, R&D intensive firms are usually based in high wage countries whereas the cost-efficient firms are based in...

We consider the issue of patent licensing in a linear city framework where firms are located at the end points of the city and compete in price. We consider three types of licensing arrangements, namely, auction, fixed fee, royalty; and focus on the optimal licensing strategy of an outsider...

Cost asymmetries between the public and the private firms create a rationale for privatising the public firms. We show that this argument is restrictive, since it does not allow for other ways of reducing production inefficiency, which creates the motivation for privatisation. If the profit...

This paper develops a supergame model of collusion between price-setting oligopolists located in different markets separated by trade costs. The firms produce a homogenous good and sustain collusion based on territorial allocation of markets. We first show, in a more general framework than some...

We show that if patent protection and trade secrecy generate asymmetric market structure, an innovator may prefer patent protection than trade secrecy even if the diffusion probability is higher under the former but it increases market concentration by preventing some imitators. So, whether an...