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We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TUgames. Chwe (1994, p.318) notes that, in this context, it is difficult to prove nonemptiness of the largest consistent set. We show that every TU-game has a nonempty largest consistent set. Moreover, the proof of this result points...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005628261
We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TU-games. We show that every TU-game has a nonempty largest consistent set and that each TU-game has a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable set. We characterize the collection of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005307858
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In this paper, we consider situations where agents face repeatedly the same decision problem. We focus on adaptive rules without beliefs. We distinguish between two kinds of models. Firstly, we study adaptive rules that are only based on private information. Decisions are made on the basis of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011020432
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We study strategic games where players' preferences are weak orders which need not admit utility representations. First of all, we extend Voorneveld's concept of best-response potential from cardinal to ordinal games and derive the analogue of his characterization result: An ordinal game is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977741
By illuminating the philosophical roots of the various notions of knowledge employed by economists, this Handbook helps to disentangle conceptual and typological issues surrounding the debate on knowledge amongst economists. Wide-ranging in scope, it explores fundamental aspects of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164491
We study a local interaction model where agents play a finite n-person game following a perturbed best-response process with inertia. We consider the concept of minimal p-best response set to analyze distributions of actions in the long run. We distinguish between two assumptions made by agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010898664
Van Damme and Weibull (1998, 2002) model the noise in games as endogenously determined tremble probabilities, by assuming that with some effort players can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. Following their methodology, we derive logit-like adjustment rules for games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010845491