This paper finds an empirical evidence that al Qaeda behaves as a contest organizer rewarding a prize to candidate extremist groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each other to prove their commitment and ability. Hence to maximize their own probability of winning the prize, each...

The financial means of international terror and transnational organized crime organizations are analyzed. First, some short remarks about the organization of international terror organizations are made. Second and in a much more detailed way a literature review is provided about the financing of...

We interpret the emergence of Jihadist terrorism in the light of contest theory. Al Qaeda may be portrayed as a contest organizer, providing a ‘prize’ to the best terrorist group. Each group maximizes its probability of winning by launching attacks more destructive than previous ones...

The main objective of this paper is to empirically investigate the socio-economic causes of terrorism and political violence in a sample of 12 countries in Western Europe. First, we show that in western European countries the classical economic argument of opportunity cost is confirmed. That is,...

We interpret the emergence of Jihadist terrorism in the light of contest theory. Al Qaeda may be portrayed as a contest organizer, providing a ‘prize’ to the best terrorist group. Each group maximizes its probability of winning by launching attacks more destructive than previous ones...

Introduzione – 1. Una breve introduzione all’analisi economica dello sport – 2. Asimmetria negli incentivi ed equilibrio competitivo – 3. Asimmetria negli incentivi e pre-determinazione di un risultato – 4. L’impatto dell’asimmetria negli incentivi in presenza di doping –...

Introduzione - 1. Il Calcio come bene di nercato - 2. Il Calcio come bene relazionale - 3. Calcio, potere e coercizione - Conclusioni e implicazioni di politica economica - Bibliografia

The article applies insights of contest theory to al Qaeda's recruitment process. Al Qaeda can be considered as a contest organizer rewarding an indivisible prize, namely, official membership and economic rewards, to candidate extremist groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each...

The phenomenon of match-fixing does constitute a constant element of sport contests. This paper presents a simple formal model in order to explain it. The intuition behind is that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is the key factor leading to match-fixing. In sum, this paper considers...

This paper presents a model of conflict in an economy characterized by two sectors. In a first sector labelled as contested sector two agents struggle in order to appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In a second sector, the uncontested sector, each agent holds...