In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights (IPRs), market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free-trade may amplify international wage differences. At the same time, integration with countries where...

We study the incentives to acquire skill in a model where heterogeneous firms and workers interact in a labor market characterized by matching frictions and costly screening. When effort in acquiring skill raises both the mean and the variance of the resulting ability distribution, multiple...

We study the equilibrium determinants of firm-level heterogeneity in a model in which firms can choose between different probability distributions when drawing productivity at the entry stage and explore the implications in closed and open economy. One novel result is that export opportunities,...

We study the incentives to improve ability in a model where heterogeneous firms and workers interact in a labor market characterized by matching frictions and costly screening. When effort in improving ability raises both the mean and the variance of the resulting ability distribution, multiple...

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where...

We study a dynamic model where growth requires long-term investment, and productivity depends on managerial selection. When ability is not ex-ante observable, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term...

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced choose a sub-optimally low...

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally...

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand,...

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced choose a sub-optimally low...