Economic interactions often take place in open communities, in which agents are free to leave a community to join a more preferred one. Tiebout (1956) conjectured that “voting with feet” might generate considerable efficiency gains since individuals with different preferences sort themselves...

To avoid the dangerous consequences of climate change, humans need to overcome two intertwined conflicts. First, they have to deal with an intra-generational conflict that emerges from the allocation of costs of climate change mitigation among different actors of the current generation. Second,...

To avoid the dangerous consequences of climate change, humans need to overcome two intertwined conflicts. First, they must deal with an intra-generational conflict that emerges from the allocation of costs of climate change mitigation among different actors of the current generation. Second,...

Considerable experimental evidence shows that although costly peer-punishment enhances cooperation in repeated public-good games, heavy punishment in early rounds leads to average period payoffs below the non-cooperative equilibrium benchmark. In an environment where past payoffs determine...

Public good provision is often local and also affects bystanders. Is provision harder if contributions harm bystanders, and is provision easier if outsiders gain a windfall profit? In an experiment we observe that both positive and negative externalities reduce provision levels whenever actors...