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The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional costs are flaws in the initial design. If the project is procured with a price-only auction, sellers who spotted some of the flaws have no incentive to reveal them early. Each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762526
A buyer seeking to outsource production may be able to find ways to reduce a potential supplier's cost, e.g., by suggesting improvements to the supplier's proposed production methods. We study how a buyer could use such "cost reduction investigations" by proposing a three-step supplier selection...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842560
auctions. Not only positive reputation ratings but also engaging in communication increases a bidder’s probability of winning …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014182497
We propose a non-sequential search model with a continuum of consumers and a finite number of firms. Both consumers and firms are heterogeneous. Consumers differ in search costs. Firms have private marginal costs of production. We show that an equilibrium price dispersion can arise in this model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012956396
the suppliers to deal with. Reverse auctions do not have this flexibility, because it is the auction rules and not the … with auctions. We find that in theory such hybrid mechanisms that remove some suppliers and a corresponding amount of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066617
This study explores stability in efficient collusion in government procurement auctions. In first- and second …-price auctions with independent private values, we look at the possibility of vetoing collusion mechanisms and the learning of the … other bidders after vetoing. The collusions in first-price auctions in simple case and second-price auctions are stable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014211854
A risk-neutral principal considers hiring one agent to improve a valuable, observable outcome. Who to hire? How to motivate? In this paper, the principal designs an incentive contract that pays according to the realized outcome and sells the contract to an agent through an auction. The paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014357642
The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding … ; Bidding ; Reverse Auctions ; Multi-Attribute Auctions ; Non-Binding Auctions ; Information Revelation ; Structural Estimation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009671097
I study the interaction between optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries. First, two sellers decide about outsourcing. By outsourcing, a seller loses information about the costs of producing to his supplier. Then the buyer designs the procurement mechanism and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340964
For a repeated procurement problem, we compare two stylized negotiating cultures which differ in how the buyer uses an entrant to exert pressure on the incumbent resembling U.S. style and Japanese style procurement. In each period, the suppliers are privately informed about their production...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490631