Showing 1 - 10 of 874
a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011447525
This study explores stability in efficient collusion in government procurement auctions. In first- and second-price auctions with independent private values, we look at the possibility of vetoing collusion mechanisms and the learning of the other bidders after vetoing. The collusions in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014211854
contract to an agent through an auction. The paper finds the class of contract-auction pairs that guarantee the principal a non …-possible expected payoff. The work is based on two contract-auction-specific assumptions: that the contract induces the contracted agent … to weakly improve the outcome, and that the auction satisfies a revenue guarantee. Under these assumptions, the principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014357642
The outcome of non-binding reverse auctions critically depends on how information is distributed during the bidding process. We use data from a large European procurement platform to study the impact of different information structures, specifically the availability of quality information to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009671097
For a repeated procurement problem, we compare two stylized negotiating cultures which differ in how the buyer uses an entrant to exert pressure on the incumbent resembling U.S. style and Japanese style procurement. In each period, the suppliers are privately informed about their production...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490631
strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms and show that it has a deferred acceptance auction representation. This … feature guarantees an implementation with a descending clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011491761
auction is the better selling mechanism. However, why exactly an auction should be preferred is unclear. Here we present an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409963
We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976063
settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an … implementation with a descending-clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks descend synchronously such …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697176
Procurement regulation aimed at curbing discrimination requires equal treatment of sellers. However, Deb and Pai (2017) show that such regulation imposes virtually no restrictions on the ability to discriminate. We propose a simple rule - imitation perfection - that restricts discrimination...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011754024