A sample of firms that focus by divesting at least one segment allows us to investigate the characteristics of segments divested as well as the nature of focusing firms. We find that firms are more likely to divest segments unrelated to the core activities of the firm and that the probability...

In acquisitions, target CEOs face a moral hazard: any personal gain from the deal could be offset by the loss of the future compensation stream associated with their jobs. Larger, more important, parachutes provide greater relief for these losses. To explicitly measure the moral hazard target...

Our work provides refined tests of the existence and source of merger gains in a neglected industry: utilities. While excluded from traditional analyses, utilities offer fertile ground for a detailed analysis of the traditional theories of synergy, collusion, hubris and anticipation. The...

Tender offers provide an ideal setting for the analysis of agency relationships since the best interests of the principal (target firm shareholders) and agent (target firm managers) are often in conflict. Moreover, the actions and stated rationale of target managers in resisting or not resisting...

We document market anticipation of merger bids and that less anticipated bids earn significantly higher announcement returns. Subsequent bidders experience significant and positive returns surrounding initial industry bid announcements. These results suggest that announcement period returns...