We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an inform tion advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses dominantstrategy. A dominant strategy is in fact unique and is given by the conditional...

Ths authors consider a first-price auction when the ranking of bidders' private valuations is common knowledge among bidders. This new informational framwork is motivated by several applications, from procurement to privatization. It induces a particular asymmetric auction model with affiliated...

First and second price collusive auction mechanisms from the literature on bid rigging within the independent private values model are extended to be applicable within the general symmetric model where signals are affiliated. A mechanism which allow information sharing is also proposed. The...

A number of recent results in mechanism design literature show that in virutally all mechanism design environments of interest, as long as agents' private information is correlated. It is possible to design mechanisms that leave agents with arbitrarily small information rents. Thus, while agents...

We study the performance of English and second price auctions in which the seller sets an optimal reserve price given his beliefs. We define the effectivess of an auction as the ration between the expected revenue it generated for the seller and the expected valuation of the object to the bidder...

We present a model of social learning in an environment with common values where informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner ; s curse. A informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner's curse. A seller of an object sequentially obtains bids...

We examine lending and bidding when bidders, whose valuation for the good and wealth are private information, must borrow to fund their bid in a first-price sealed-bid auction. Any separating equilibrium is unique and the winning bidder typw randomnizes their bids.

We present new conditions that guarantee the existence of mechanism with a unique or essentially unique equilibrium in auction and public goods problems with quasi-linear utility functions. These conditions bear only on the information structures of the agents.

The theory of auctions of a single object generalizes to a situation where identical objects are sold either sequentially or simultaneously but individuals can only buy one object. In this context, I will present a survey of the main results regarding the ranking of auctions based on revenue,...