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Chapter 9 Representative democracy as social choice

Schofield, Norman - In: Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 1, (pp. 425-455). 2002

representation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023834

Local candidates and distributive politics under closed-list proportional representation

Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr; Smith, Daniel M. - 2018

Geographic representation is an important consideration in candidate nominations, even under closed-list proportional … representation (PR), and may even matter for distributive policy outcomes. However, since nominations are determined strategically …, the causal effects of local representation are difficult to identify. We investigate the relationship between local …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011846263

The welfare economics of tactical voting in democracies : a partial identification equilibrium analysis

Demeze, Herman; Moyouwou, Issofa; Pongou, Roland - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011542864

United We Vote

Eguia, Jon X. - 2006

This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312299

Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences

Peters, Hans; Roy, Souvik; Storcken, Ton - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 485-496

We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, gamma -strategy-proofnessmeaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number gamma cannot manipulateand unanimity, we show that such rules are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317111

Euclidean preferences, option sets and strategyproofness

Bordes, Georges; Laffond, Gilbert; Le Breton, Michel - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 469-483

In this note, we use the technique of option sets to sort out the implications of coalitional strategyproofness in the spatial setting. We also discuss related issues and open problems.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317113

Majority relation and median representative ordering

Demange, Gabrielle - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 95-109

This paper presents results on the transitivity of the majority relation and the existence of a median representative ordering. Building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, the analysis extends well-known results obtained when the underlying graph is a line. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317116

Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model

Borck, Rainald - 2003

This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260659

How should large and small countries be represented in a currency union?

Berger, Helge; Mueller, Till - 2004

representation in a federal central bank addressing this question. Optimal voting weights reflect two opposing forces: the wish to …- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might be extreme by the standards of the US Fed and German …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261091

On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; van Winden, Frans - 2006

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261435