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Laslier, Jean-François; Van der Straeten, Karine - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 11 (2008) 1, pp. 97-105

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003711275

Strategic voting under committee approval : a theory

Laslier, Jean-François; Van der Straeten, Karine - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301879

Strategic voting under committee approval : an application to the 2011 regional government election in Zurich

Lachat, Romain; Laslier, Jean-François; Van der … - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301880

Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting : a theory for large electorates

Laslier, François; Van der Straeten, Karine - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686140

Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting : a theory for large electorates

Laslier, Jean-François; Van der Straeten, Karine - In: Social choice and welfare 47 (2016) 3, pp. 559-587

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574551

Citizens' preferences about voting rules : self-interest, ideology, and sincerity

Blais, André; Laslier, Jean-François; Poinas, François; … - In: Public choice 164 (2015) 3/4, pp. 423-442

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011472700

Influence versus utility in the evaluation of voting rules : a new look at the Penrose formula

Le Breton, Michel; Van der Straeten, Karine - In: Public choice 165 (2015) 1/2, pp. 103-122

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011472739

Distributive politics : does electoral competition promote inequality?

Laslier, Jean-François; Picard, Natalie - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001470220

Distributive politics and electoral competition

Laslier, Jean-François; Picard, Natalie - In: Journal of economic theory 103 (2002) 1, pp. 106-130

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001661320

Assessing the extent of strategic manipulation: The average vote example

Renault, Régis; Trannoy, Alain - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 2 (2011) 4, pp. 497-513

The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrepancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is sufficiently large, it is possible to construct approximations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317062