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A simple game (N,v) is given by a set N of n players and a partition of 2N into a set L of losing coalitions L with value v(L) = 0 that is closed under taking subsets and a set W of winning coalitions W with v(W) = 1. Simple games with α = minp>0 maxW∈W,L∈L p(L) p(W) < 1 are exactly the weighted voting games. We show that α 6 1 4n for every simple game (N,v), confi rming the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz (IJGT, 2014). For complete simple games, Freixas and Kurz conjectured that α = O(√n). We prove this conjecture up to a ln n factor. We also prove that for graphic simple games, that is, simple games in which every minimal winning coalition has size 2, computing α is NP-hard, but polynomial-time solvable if the underlying graph is bipartite. Moreover, we show that for every graphic simple game, deciding if α < a is polynomial-time solvable for every fixed a > 0
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012909150
In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting districts among larger administrative regions. This recommendation requires the size of any constituency not to differ from the average constituency size by more than a fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010197548
One of the aims of the new electoral law of Hungary has been to define a fairer apportionment into voting districts. This is ensured by a set of rules slightly more premissive than those laid out in the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission. These rules fix the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009628411
One of the aims of the new electoral law of Hungary has been to define a fairer apportionment into voting districts. This is ensured by a set of rules slightly more premissive than those laid out in the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Venice Commission. These rules fix the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494515