This paper considers the search for the best papers by the editors of an academic journal. At each period, each editor receives a set of submissions and has to decide which paper to accept. Some editors being more demanding than others, researchers choose the quality level of their papers taking...

This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications. Given imperfect information about journals' editorial line, authors can sometimes target a wrong journal; in turn, the editor will desk-reject their paper. An equilibrium is de…ned as a situation where both editors...

This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications. Given imperfect information about journals’editorial line, authors can sometimes target a wrong journal; in turn, the editor will desk-reject their paper. An equilibrium is de…ned as a situation where both...

This paper studies the publishing game played by researchers and editors when the editors adopt an impartial selection process. It analyzes the possibility of congestion in the editorial process and shows that, depending on the nature of the equilibrium, the rise of the rejection costs could be...

This paper considers the search for the best papers by the editors of an academic journal. Editors' search is sequential. At each period, each editor receives one submission from a researcher and has to decide if she accepts or rejects the paper. The editorial board is heterogeneous, some...