Network operators of competing infrastructures in European electronic communications markets face asymmetric regulation: incumbent telecommunications firms are required to open their networks for retail broadband competition, while cable companies have no such obligation. Furthermore, for...

Network shares and retail prices are not symmetric in the telecommunications market with multiple bottlenecks which give rise to new questions of access fee regulation. In this paper we consider a model with two types of asymmetry arising from different entry timing, i.e. a larger reputation for...

Network shares and retail prices are not symmetric in the telecommunications market with multiple bottlenecks which give rise to new questions of access fee regulation. In this paper we consider a model with two types of asymmetry arising from different entry timing, i.e. a larger reputation for...

Network operators of competing infrastructures in European electronic communications markets face asymmetric regulation: incumbent telecommunications firms are required to open their networks for retail broadband competition, while cable companies have no such obligation. Furthermore, for...

VDSL and G.fast Vectoring are transmission technologies over copper access line pairs enabling the transmission of higher bandwidth to the end customers, but harm the infrastructure based competition using physical unbundled copper lines. Thus regulators have to decide between infrastructure...

This article addresses the impact of regulatory policy on levels of infrastructure deployment and derived welfare in the telecommunications sector. The model considers two potentially coexisting and partially competing techniques (the old ADSL - Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line - technique) -...

In this paper, we study the adjustments made by National Regulatory Authorities to simple margin squeeze tests, in order to model a reasonably efficient operator. More precisely, by inspecting the possible differences between an entrant and an incumbent that would cause a market disadvantage for...

In this paper, we study the adjustments that National Regulatory Authorities make to simple margin squeeze tests, when using them ex-ante. More precisely, by inspecting the possible differences between an entrant and the incumbent that would cause a market disadvantage for the former, we provide...