I generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in call demand. Empirical work has shown call demand to increase significantly with income. For any positive income effect, network operators prefer a termination rate above marginal cost if networks are...

I generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in call demand. Empirical work has shown call demand to increase signi ficantly with income. For any positive income effect, network operators prefer a termination rate above marginal cost if networks are...

We analyse network competition in a market with international calls. National regulatory agencies (NRAs) have incentives to set regulated termination rates above marginal cost to extract rent from international call termination. International network ownership and deregulation are alternatives...

The world's first multinational electricity market was formed with the creation of the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool. We analyze the incentives to undertake transmission network investment in the context of the liberalized Nordic electricity market. Welfare improving investment in a...

This paper develops a framework for analyzing the incentives of national transmission system operators (TSOs) to supply cross-border interconnection capacity in an international electricity market. Our results show that equilibrium transmission capacity is downward distorted, even in situations...

We extend the workhorse model of network competition to international calls. This model enables us to show that national regulatory authorities (NRAs) maximizing domestic welfare have incentives to increase termination rates above the social optimum to extract rent from international call...