We examine how political corruption affects firms' accounting choices. We hypothesize and find that firms headquartered in corrupt districts manipulate earnings downwards, relative to firms headquartered elsewhere. Our finding is robust to alternative corruption measures, restatement-based...

Using hand-collected data on firms' interim reporting frequency from 1951 to 1973, we examine the impact of financial reporting frequency on information asymmetry and the cost of equity. Our results show that higher reporting frequency reduces information asymmetry and the cost of equity, and...

We examine how the regulation of financial reporting frequency affects corporate innovation. We use a difference-in-differences approach based on a sample of treatment firms that experience a change in their reporting frequency and matched industry peers and control firms whose reporting...

We hypothesize that employees prefer conservative accounting. We test our hypothesis, using the setting of the German law on codetermination. The law mandates half of the board seats to be filled by employee representatives if the firm’s number of domestic employees (DE) exceeds the threshold...